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Abstract 
The analysis of vulnerabilities in large complex spaces is fundamentally problematic. The lack of capacity 
to generate a threat assessment merely exacerbates this problem. Lacking as well, in current literature is 
a developed methodology. To overcome this problem, we propose an approach using multi-agent 
modelling, which is also melded with three dimensional (3D) tactical understandings. Our approach builds 
on a microsimulation decision support tool, which was developed for a behavioural simulation of CBRN 
events. Microsimulation is based on the individual; who as an individual has a number of attributes, and 
which are stochastic (when repeated within an attribute). This approach is then enveloped. The 
simulations approach is intended for simulation of global and social controls and is designed to deal 
effectively with separate population groups. Each group has rules based on the group’s behaviour and 
attributes, and complex scenarios can be built very simply. This therefore, enables analysis of emergent 
group behaviours and patterns. Our approach is akin to chemical or fire spread quantification. It views 
particle spread analysis as synonymous with complex movement (or stationary location) of many active 
agents within a complex 3D environment. This approach, we believe is needed to ‘solve’ the counter 
terrorism problem presented by scenarios such as the 2007 Haymarket attack; such as, how to analyse 
such events, as well as develop effective interdiction. A discrete behaviour model approach is suggested. 
This approach through repeated simulation (within the same parameters) should build up a statistical 
pattern of domain behaviour. As well, information on the outcome of changing behaviour can also be 
logged. Therefore, individual outcomes can be matched against real-time data to give best prediction of 
eventual outcomes, and the range of future strategies based on closest approach to reality. Taking this 
approach, potential targets could then be given random attributes including movement, size, speed, 
destination, and degree of deception being used in behaviour. Superimposing targets from known 
information and still building in random attributes about what is not known, will allow forward prediction 
with back-correction over time as information becomes more available. As well, failure rates and other 
assumptions could also be gradually relaxed, and this will allow for continuous assessment of 
assumptions as real data becomes available. 
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Abstract. The analysis of vulnerabilities in large complex spaces is fundamentally problematic. The lack of capacity 
to generate a threat assessment merely exacerbates this problem. Lacking as well, in current literature is a developed 
methodology. To overcome this problem, we propose an approach using multi-agent modelling, which is also 
melded with three dimensional (3D) tactical understandings. Our approach builds on a microsimulation decision 
support tool, which was developed for a behavioural simulation of CBRN events. Microsimulation is based on the 
individual; who as an individual has a number of attributes, and which are stochastic (when repeated within an 
attribute). This approach is then enveloped. The simulations approach is intended for simulation of global and social 
controls and is designed to deal effectively with separate population groups. Each group has rules based on the 
group’s behaviour and attributes, and complex scenarios can be built very simply. This therefore, enables analysis of 
emergent group behaviours and patterns. Our approach is akin to chemical or fire spread quantification. It views 
particle spread analysis as synonymous with complex movement (or stationary location) of many active agents 
within a complex 3D environment. This approach, we believe is needed to ‘solve’ the counter terrorism problem 
presented by scenarios such as the 2007 Haymarket attack; such as, how to analyse such events, as well as develop 
effective interdiction. A discrete behaviour model approach is suggested. This approach through repeated simulation 
(within the same parameters) should build up a statistical pattern of domain behaviour. As well, information on the 
outcome of changing behaviour can also be logged. Therefore, individual outcomes can be matched against real-
time data to give best prediction of eventual outcomes, and the range of future strategies based on closest approach 
to reality. Taking this approach, potential targets could then be given random attributes including movement, size, 
speed, destination, and degree of deception being used in behaviour. Superimposing targets from known information 
and still building in random attributes about what is not known, will allow forward prediction with back-correction 
over time as information becomes more available. As well, failure rates and other assumptions could also be 
gradually relaxed, and this will allow for continuous assessment of assumptions as real data becomes available. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The very nature of large complex spaces, and the 
dynamic of many free agents – people, traffic etc., 
produces a confused environment. In classical military 
theory, this is identified as generating the fog of war, 
this nullifying battlefield transparency [1]. The key 
problem is that events transpire simultaneously, as an 
undivided and continuous set of events/actions, which 
occur at the same time. Overcoming these conceptual 
difficulties, we have developed in our more recent work 
on 3D tactics the formulation – 
“3D tactics is premised on ‘area analyses’ where the 
entire space surrounding a target is subject to 
continuous simultaneous review, constantly seeking out 
multidimensional attack.” [1] [2] 
This paper develops the current research in the area of 
3D vulnerabilities modelling, linking this to modelling 
multiagent movement and interdiction. 
2. SUMMARY OF THE 3-D TACTICS 
ANALYSIS CONCEPT 
We have previously proposed a line model to 
demonstrate the 3D tactics concept which is reproduced 
in Figure 1. [4] This example develops a ‘look-around’ 
analysis; encouraging thinking tactically in three 
dimensions, and simultaneously watching 
multidimensional actions. Using tools such as these, we 
can begin to identify within complex spaces, and among 
seemingly diffuse vulnerabilities and opportunities, 
clear target and defence patterns. We have previously 
found that accommodating the full context of a complex 
space, seeking to identify the clustering of 
vulnerabilities and targets in 3D spaces is near –
impossible [2] [4]. For instance, in the case of the 2007 
Haymarket attack, it was the vigilance of ambulance 
crews and parking staff who noticed the vehicles. 
However, it was purely happenstance that these 
weapons were identified at all. The use of vehicles, 
carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs), of a type 
typically seen parked there, at a time when no one 
would potentially notice, explains the success of the 
perpetrators. Successful, because they were able to 
exploit the inherent information deception attributes of 
this space, and deploys these IEDs in the first place [2]. 
Figure 1 demonstrates these dynamic, between 
opportunities (O), vulnerabilities (V) and targets, in 







Figure 1. 3D Tactical Environment: Identifying where 
Opportunities (O) and Vulnerabilities (V) link. 
This model identifies an open space between two built 
areas (identified as buildings ‘A’ and ‘B’). 
Demonstrated are the links between attack opportunities 
and vulnerabilities, such as found in multi-level 
buildings, large transit spaces, covered rail stations, 
plazas, commercial precincts and malls. The basic 3D 
tactics concept, articulated here is that within the 





), illustrative of dynamic 
multiagent moving or stationary within the 
environment. However, only certain vulnerabilities are 
paired with opportunities. These paired ‘V+O’ are 
usually linear linked by some common line of transport 
(i.e. a road). This allows these to be targeted. The line of 
targets presents an attacker with multiple opportunities. 
Using a potential problem (opportunity analysis) 
approach to the scenario described in Figure 1 identifies 
the direction, risks, and myriad of other things that can 
give an advantage. The key question is how in a 
multiagent environment, do we develop effective 
interdiction? 
3. INTERDICTION THEORY 
Maritime interdiction and land-air Interdiction 
operations have developed some of the key concepts. 
Land-air interdiction theory regards as essential, that 
when affecting interdiction, achieves a ‘significant 
volume of space free from an adversary’s interference’. 
[7] As well, one of the adversaries needs to be able to 
deny his opponent ‘entry to a significant volume of 
airspace, yet allow friendly forces freedom of 
manoeuvre.’ [7] The second essential concept identified 
important is that interdiction, to be successful – it has to 
‘destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military 
potential before it can be brought to bear effectively 
against friendly forces, at such distance from friendly 
forces’ [6] 
Fundamentally, any movement in space by an agent will 
travel along a path, while the direction, speed and height 
will be determined by factors such as mode of 
movement, and influenced by taking the line of least 
resistance avoiding contact or collision with other 
agents, or obstacles located along the movement line. 
Interdiction seeks to anticipate the line of approach of 
an agent, and either intercept before it reaches its target 
or as close as possible to its place of origin [3]. Little 
however, has been developed in regard to modelling 
capacity. For instance, dynamic queuing modelling has 
been advocated – this methodology: “consists of a set of 
things arriving at a system and seeking service (or to 
avoid service), a number of servers seeking to provide 
(impose) service, and a set of behaviour guidelines for 
arrivals and servers.” [5] 
Problematically, the queuing approach seeks to develop 
an ordering, and it is therefore heavily dependent on the 
scenario(s) chosen and introduces a constraint on the 
analysis. As sensing through intelligence and 
surveillance is at the centre of this method, then judicial 
used of this data with forecasting and backcastng 
models would be a more realistic approach to this 
interception problem. Difficulties also arise from 
considering the real chaotic environment. The challenge 
is authenticating many dynamic agents simultaneously. 
We propose a different approach akin to chemical or 
fire spread mathematical quantification; here, the 
complex movement of many active agents through a 3D 
environment offers insight into how to develop tactics. 
This mathematical approach will be reviewed next. 
4. MULTIAGENCY MODELLING 
The alternative approach to interception is the use of a 
random or chaotic model of individual behaviour that 
captures the elements of reality and avoids the major 
pitfall of steady state approaches, which subsumes 
important dynamic factors by aggregation and hence 
these are effectively forgotten about. This is similar to 
analysis of catastrophic accidents, where the time 
element on the factors that lead to the accident is 
effectively lost. 
Microsimulation is a discrete simulation technique 
which allows for the modelling of the behaviour of 
single individuals in a complex system [1] [8]. It was 
originally devised for financial and economic modelling 
[11] [9], but is generally applicable to a wide range of 
scenarios. In the current research project, we have 
created a modular, scalable microsimulation package, 
called Simulacron, which allows for the rapid creation 
of microsimulations involving large numbers of people 
interacting with each other and their environment. A 
new simulation module has been integrated with the 
existing components.  This new module, the “TPC” 
system, will allow the modelling of three distinct groups 
with differing behaviours as follows: 
• Terrorists (the ‘T’ group): These are individuals 
who move through the environment until, at a 
predetermined moment in time, they attack, causing 
the ‘deaths’ of any individuals sharing their 

















model parameters, a ‘camouflage factor’ (Fc) which 
determines how effective they are at concealing 
themselves from law enforcement. 
• Police (the ‘P’ group): These are individuals who 
move through the environment attempting to detect 
terrorist presence. If a police officer detects a 
terrorist, then that terrorist is ‘killed’ (and removed 
from the simulation). Each police officer has, in 
addition to standard model parameters, a 
‘perception factor’ (Fp) which determines how 
effective they are at spotting the bad guys. 
• Citizens (the ‘C’ group): These are the remaining 
individuals in the environment. They do not 
participate in the simulation except in the sense that 
they could be killed at any moment. 
Detection is deemed to have occurred if, in any 
simulated period of time in which a terrorist and a 
police officer are collocated, a randomly determined 
value falls below the detection threshold defined by Fp 
(1 – Fc). Similarly the terrorist has a probability option 
to blow themselves upon detection. This basic model 
may be varied by changing properties in a logical 
manner.  For example, replacing the instantaneous 
lethality of the terrorist attack with a probabilistic one (a 
smaller bomb) or replacing it with a conventional 
infective state, simulating the release of a biological 
agent. Because of the flexibility of the program, police 
behaviours can range from completely random to 
precisely specified. The latter, allowing the 
investigation and validation of predetermined 
interdiction strategies such as those derived from game-
theoretic modelling [10]. 
As an example of this approach Figure 2 shows the 
outcome for ten repeated simulations within a ‘model’ 
community of 400 houses; and 940 people; with one or 














































Figure 2. Frequency of casualties for one and two 
terrorist in a community of 940 people. The first and 
second attempts refer to the two terrorist scenario. 
Figure 2 illustrates the following scenario - the target 
for the terrorists is the ‘club’ at 9:23 pm on a Friday 
night. The program is run ten times with ten police 
trying to intercept either one or two terrorists 
respectively within this community. The terrorists have 
a camouflage factor of 0.8 and a 50% chance that they 
will commit suicide if discovered early. The police have 
a perception factor of 0.8. The simulation starts on the 
previous Monday at 6:00 am. Figure 2 shows the 
numbers of deaths as a function of the frequency within 
each range. 
In the ten runs with the single terrorist, the results were: 
• Police intercept and arrest on 3 occasions. 
• On four occasions there were casualties in excess of 
60 people, of which only one was at the target time; 
the other three occasions, (two at the club and one 
at the cinema) the terrorist pre-emptively 
committed suicide on being intercepted. 
• On the remaining three occasions the terrorist also 
took pre-emptive action resulting in less than 60 
casualties. These occurred in shops and a restaurant 
respectively. 
With two terrorists in the community, one complete 
interdiction occurred (arrest of both in the same run), 
even though the first and second terrorists were arrested 
four times each. Neither terrorist made it to the 
designated target time and chose pre-emptive suicide on 
the other occasions of discovery rather than arrest. The 
highest casualty rate occurred with two events occurring 
four days apart at the club. This demonstrates the ability 
to model coordinated attacks. 
While these results are very preliminary, they 
demonstrate the ability to model both terrorist tactics 
and to study alternative interdiction strategies and relate 
those to the environment under study. An advantage of 
this discrete behaviour modelling is that multi agency 
resources as well as antagonistic behaviours of targets 
can easily be programmed into a simulation. Repeated 
simulation with the same parameters builds up a 
statistical pattern of domain behaviour as well as 
information on the outcome of changing the behaviour. 
If surveillance and intelligence data is available, then 
individual outcomes can be matched against real time 
data to give best prediction of the eventual outcome as 
well as the range of future strategies based on closest 
approach to reality. This uses a back correction forward 
predictor approach to modelling the outcome. 
If you take customs maritime interception as an example 
against smuggling then you might have finite resources 
in planes, ships and shore people available. And these 
might be dispersed over several different agencies. Each 
resource has its own attributes including availability, 
location, speed etc. that dictate the range of surveillance 
and interception capabilities at any one time. Similarly 
targets can be given random attributes such as 
movement, size, speed, destination, degree of deception 
being used in behaviour that allows optimisation of 
deployment against them. This can be used as a 
planning tool for resourcing requirements. 
Superimposing targets from known information but still 
building in random attributes about what is not known 
allows forward prediction with back correction over 
time. As long as concurrent information is deployed to 
all resources then tasking becomes a relatively simple 
matter to achieve a desired rate of success. 
A question that arises in this approach is at what point 
do intervention strategies depend on resourcing 
availability before the system starts to fail? And, is 
there, an optimum amount of information required for a 
given success rate? These can also be tested in this type 
of modelling approach as well as alternative interdiction 
strategies. Standard interdiction models deal poorly with 
dispersed areas of surveillance and the time taken to 
achieve interdiction unless targets can be corralled. 
Even this involves a seven stage process of which one 
or more elements might fail. Furthermore what happens 
when intelligence gathered is part of a deception 
operation? A discrete behaviour model on the other 
hand can assess these types of changes because the 
statistics can be built up rather than assumed, such as 
failure rates, and other assumptions can also be 
gradually relaxed. This allows for continuous 
assessment of assumptions as real data becomes 
available. A critical process though is simultaneous 
display of exactly the same data across disparate control 
centres and resources so everybody is using exactly the 
same data in real time and where real time feedback on 
decisions can be used to enhance interpretation of the 
data and make forward predictions. 
As an example, let us consider the 2007 attempted 
bombings in the London Haymarket, where an attempt 
was made to triangulate and sequentially detonate two 
car bombs. Analysis of this type of problem before the 
fact requires an analysis of the space and its use over 
time. This analysis is twofold, the analysis of the 
connectivity between spaces which can be used to 
determine where people can go and analysis of typical 
movement of people throughout the day. Both of these 
are then used to set up population movement in the 
domain of interest. Overlaying alternative behaviours 
such as interdiction agencies responses and the cues on 
which they act as well as alternative aggressor strategies 
allows analysis of the space for terrorist opportunities 
and the likely interdiction. Many different weapon 
systems can be assessed because each has its own 
constraints related to the space and geography, which 
dictate how these can be deployed. It also allows for 
testing of interdictions strategies and response to an 
event based on different degrees of intelligence or 
surveillance as well as determining the most effective 
use of data coming from that space. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper is to combine basic 3D tactical 
analysis concept with multiagent modelling and 
interdiction tactics theory, thus developing a more 
dynamic analysis. We believe, this approach leads us on 
the way to developing more advanced 3D GIS –based 
tool as a planning device when developing counter 
terrorist plans for complex spaces. The object of such a 
tool is to demonstrate where in complex environments 
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